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JUDICIAL REVIEW PRIOR TO MARBURY V. MADISON
T HE foundations of the doctrine of judicial review' were
formulated on the continent of Europe and in England many
years prior to the time of the American Revolution. In England,
prior to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the doctrine of a funda-
mental law- a law which acts of Parliament might not con-
travene- was vigorously defended by Lord Coke in his contro-
versy with James .2 In the noted Dr. Bonham's Case, Coke
asserted:
It appears in our books that in many cases the common law will
control acts of parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly
void; for when an act of parliament is against common right or rea-
son, or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the common law will
control it and adjudge such act to be void.
Reason and the common law as interpreted by the courts was re-
garded as superior to both the King and Parliament.'
The doctrine of judicial review was exercised by England in
her relations with the American colonies. The acts of the colonial
assemblies were constantly reviewed by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council to make sure they were in pursuance of the
supreme law of the colonies - the charters of the colonies and
the laws of England. Out of 8,823 acts of the colonial assemblies
1 Edward S. Corwin said that the doctrine of judicial review comprises the follow-
ing propositions: "that the constitution is law in the strict sense of a body of rules
known to and enforceable by courts; that it is law of higher obligation than any legis-
lative act which purports to have been made under its sanction; that consequently the
court must in case of conflict between the constitution and a legislative act determine
the rights of parties in accordance with the former; that by the principle of the separa-
tion of powers a judicial interpretation of the standing law and so of the constitution is
final for the determination of the case in which it was rendered." 8 ENcYc. Soc. ScI.
(1932), Judicial Review, p. 457.
2 HAINES, . CHARLES GROVE, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
(Univ. of Calif. Press, Berkeley, Calif., 2d ed. 1932) 44 ff.
8 8 Co. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C. P. 1610).
'HAINS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 99.
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submitted to the Privy Council from 1696 to 1782, more than
600 were declared null and void.5
Another precedent for judicial review was that the state courts
had been exercising this power prior to the Federal Convention.
Some of the outstanding cases in which legislative acts were
declared null and void by state courts are: Holmes v. Walton
(1780), a New Jersey case;6 Commonwealth v. Caton (1782), a
Virginia case;' Trevitt v. Weeden (1786), a Rhode Island case;'
and Bayard v. Singleton (1787), a North Carolina case.9
Likewise, there can be no doubt that the majority of the mem-
bers of the Federal Convention of 1787 believed that the Consti-
tution would secure to the courts the right to pass on the validity
of the acts of Congress. The following members of the Federal
5 Patterson C. Perry, The Development and Evaluation of Judicial Review, 13 Wash. L.
Rev. 76 (1938). Thus, the work of the Privy Council constituted a precedent and a
preparation for the power of judicial annulment upon constitutional grounds now
exercised by the state and federal courts in the United States. HAINES, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 49.
6 The courts of New Jersey were pioneers in practicing the doctrine of judicial
review. Holmes v. Walton is the first recorded case where a court invalidated an act
because it was in conflict with a provision of the constitution of the state. HAINES, op.
cit., at 92.
In this case Justice Wythe, John Marshall's law professor and later a delegate to
the Federal Convention, had the following to say regarding judicial review: "If the
whole legislature, an event to be depreciated, should attempt to overleap the bounds
prescribed to them by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the country,
will meet the united powers at my seat, in this tribunal; and pointing to the Consti-
tution, will say to them, here is the limit of your authority, and hither shall you go,
but no further."
8 In this case James Varnum asserted "that the legislative have the uncontrollable
power of making laws not repugnant to the constitution; the judiciary have the sole
power of judging of those laws, and are bound to execute them; but cannot admit any
act of the legislative as law, which is against the constitution."
9About the same time that the Federal Convention began its work in Philadelphia,
the court of North Carolina handed down its decision in Bayard v. Singleton. The court
made the following observation on its right to declare a legislative act void: "But that
it was clear, that no act they [the Legislature] could pass, could by any means repeal
or alter the constitution, because if they could do this, they would at the same instant
of time, destroy their own existence as a legislature and dissolve the government thereby
established. Consequently the constitution (which the judicial was bound to take notice
of as much as of any other law whatever) standing in full force as the fund.arental
law of the land, notwithstanding the act on which the present motion wabhgrounded,
the same act must of course, in that instance, stand as abrogated and without any
effect." COMMAGER, HENRY STE.E (Editor), DocuMENTs or AmERICAN HISTORY (F. S.
Crofts & Co., N. Y. 1934) 151.
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Convention asserted that this would be the case; Gerry and King
of Massachusetts, Wilson and Gouverneur Morris of Pennsyl-
vania, Martin of Maryland, Randolph, Madison and Mason of
Virginia, Dickinson of Delaware, Yates and Hamilton of New
York, Rutledge and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, Davie
and Williamson of North Carolina, Sherman and Ellsworth of
Connecticut. While these are only seventeen names out of a total
of fifty-five members, they constitute three-fourths of the leaders
of the Convention, four of the five members of the Committee of
Detail which drafted the Constitution, and four of the five mem-
bers of the Committee of Style which gave final form to the
Constitution.1"
Many critics of judicial review ask why, if the framers of the
Constitution wanted judicial review and still thought it necessary
to provide for it specifically, did they not choose and place in the
Constitution the appropriate language to give the courts this power
as was true, for example, with the veto power of the President.
The answer is that judicial review was universally regarded as
a feature of the new system while its adoption was pending. In
short, judicial review rested upon certain principles which the
framers of the Constitution believed needed no further elabora-
tion, as, for example, certain general principles made unnecessary
specific provision for the President's power of removal.'
The attitude of some of the delegates toward the doctrine of
judicial review was expressed by Sherman and Gouverneur Mor-
ris when the convention voted down on July 17, 1887, by a vote
of seven to three," the clause "to negative all laws passed by the
several states, contravening, in the opinion of the national legis-
lature, the Articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the
authority of the Union." Mr. Sherman thought that the resolution
10 CORWIN, EDWARD S., THE DOcTRINE Or JUDICIAL REVIEw (Princeton Univ. Press,
Princeton, N. J. 1914) 10, 11.
II Id. at 16.
12 5 ELLIOTT, JONATHAN (Editor), DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (J. B.
Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1901) 322.
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giving Congress the authority to veto state laws was "unecessary,
as the courts of the states would not consider as valid any law
contravening the authority of the Union," and Morris believed "a
law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the judiciary
department."18
On the same day that this resolution was defeated, Luther
Martin presented a resolution which had appeared in the small-
state plan on June 15, providing that the national laws made in
pursuance of the national constitution, and all treaties of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the several states. The
resolution was adopted without dissent. 4
On August 23 Mr. Rutledge moved to amend Mr. Martin's
resolution to read:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance
thereof, and all the treaties made under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the several States, and of their cit-
izens and inhabitants: and the judges of the several states shall be
bound thereby in their decisions, anything in the constitutions or laws
of the several states to the contrary notwithstanding.15
This resolution was also agreed upon without a dissenting
vote. " The wording of the provision as it finally appeared in the
Constitution differs but slightly. 7 It made the Constitution, as
well as laws and treaties passed in pursuance of the Constitution,
the supreme law of the land. In seeking a constitutional basis for
judicial review, one cannot overemphasize the importance of this
declaration. Since the Constitution is law, nothing contrary to it
can also be law. Furthermore, the judges in their courtrooms must
maintain the authority of government and the binding effect of
the Constitution on which the federal system rests. The judges
are bound to recognize and apply the Constitution as the funda-
mental law.
is Id. at 321.
14 Id. at 192.
'5 Id. at 467.
16 Ibid.
17 Article VI, 2.
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The supreme law clause, as finally adopted, only mentions state
judges; but federal judges must also treat the Constitution as law.
This simple logic is supplemented by the words of the Third
Article of the Constitution giving to the federal courts jurisdiction
of cases arising under the Constitution, laws of the United States
and treaties. I" It is only logical to assume that the courts must
interpret the Constitution and determine its particular applica-
tions before they can decide certain kinds of controversies; and
in doing so they may be called upon to uphold the Constitution
and ignore an act.
The arguments of several delegates on a proposed council of
revision for the general government present further evidence that
the framers of the Constitution were thoroughly familiar with the
doctrine of judicial review and most of them expected the courts
to exercise it. 9
Madison believed that a council of revision would enhance the
independence of the judiciary by "giving it an additional oppor-
tunity to defend itself against legislative encroachments." He
thought that "it would be useful to the executive, by inspiring
additional confidence and firmness in exe'ting the revisionary
power." He stated that a council of revision would be "an addi-
tional check against a pursuit of those unwise and unjust measures
which constituted so great a portion of our calamities."20
Mr. Gerry, however, was opposed to the council of revision be-
cause "it was making the expositors of the laws the legislators,
which ought never to be done." Mr. Strong also thought "that the
power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of expound-
I's Article III, § 2, 1.
19 The Virginia plan, providing for a council of revision, read: "Resolved, that the
executive, and a convenient number of the national judiciary, ought to compose a
council of revision, with authority to examine every act of the national legislature before
it shall operate, and every act of a particular legislature before a negative thereon shall
be final; and that the dissent of the said council shall amount to a rejection, unless
the act of the national legislature be again passed, or that of a particular legislature
be again negatived by-of the members of each branch." 5 ELLIOTT, op. cit. supra note
12, at 128.
20 Id. at 345.
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ing the laws."'" The crowning argument for judicial review was
given by Mr. Luther Martin when he stated that he saw no need
for a council of revision to act as a check upon legislation, for
"as to the constitutionality of laws, that point will come before
the judges in their official character." He further commented that
"in this character they have a negative on the laws. Join them
with the executive in the revision, and they will have a double
negative.""
The council of revision was finally defeated because most of
the delegates were afraid that a supreme court veto would drag
the court into politics, destroy its dignity and weaken instead of
strengthen its powers. Mr. Sherman voiced the sentiments of many
of the delegates when he made the statement on August 15, 1787,
that he "disapproved of judges meddling into politics and parties.
We have gone far enough in forming the negative as it now
stands." 3
On July 23 Madison, arguing for ratification of the Constitution
by the people instead of by state legislatures (as many delegates
advocated - including Ellsworth, Morris and King), made the
following statement, which is formidable evidence of the right
of the courts to declare legislative acts null and void because of
their unconstitutionality. He considered:
the difference between a system founded on the people to be the true
difference between a league or treaty, and a constitution. The former, in
point of moral obligation, might be as inviolate as the latter. In point
of political operation, there were two important distinctions in favor
of the latter. First, a law violating a treaty ratified by a preexisting
law might be respected by the judges as a law, though an unwise or
perfidious one. A law violating a constitution established by the people
themselves would be considered by the judges as null and void. 24
Also, controversies that might arise over the division of powers
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 346.
231d. at 430.
24 d. at 356.
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between the federal and state governments were a sound reason
why the courts would, out of necessity, exercise the power of
judicial review. Madison wrote in The Federalist that judicial
supremacy was necessary "to prevent an appeal to the sword and
a dissolution of the compact." In settling a controversy between
the federal and state governments Madison said that "the decision
is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitu-
tion, and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken
to secure this impartiality.
' 2
Moreover, declarations were made by delegates to the various
ratifying conventions of the states contending that the courts had
the power of judicial review. In the Pennsylvania Ratifying Con-
vention of November 20, 1787, Mr. Wilson made the following
remarks:
If a law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by this
instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their inde-
pendence, and the particular powers of government being defined, will
declare such law to be null and void; for the power of the Constitution
predominates. Anything, therefore, that shall be enacted by Congress
contrary thereto, will not have the force of law.2
Mr. Ellsworth, speaking before the Ratifying Convention of
Connecticut on January 7, 1788, also upheld the right of judicial
review. 7 John Marshall, speaking before the Virginia Ratifying
25 RHys, ERNFST (Editor), THE FEDERALIST (E. P. Dutton & Co., N. Y. 1934) No.
39 at 195. Hamilton, on judicial review, wrote in The Federalist: "The complete inde.
pendence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By
a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions
to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bill of attainder,
no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in prac.
tice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must
be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without
this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."
No. 78 at 396.
20 2 ELLIOTT, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 489.
27 Id. at 196. Mr. Ellsworth said: "This Constitution defines the extent of the powers
of the general government. If the general legislature should at any time overleap their
limits, the judicial department is a constitutional check. If the United States go beyond
their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void;
and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to
be made independent, will declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the states go
beyond their limits, if they make a law which is a usurpation upon the general gov-
ernment, the law is void; and upright, independent judges will declare it so." Ibid.
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Convention, said that "if they [the Congress] were to make a law
not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be
considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution
which they are to guard." Furthermore, "they would not consider
such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare
it void."2 Mr. W. R. Davie, speaking in the North Carolina
Ratifying Convention, likewise believed the courts would exercise
the power of judicial review.29 It is significant to note that all of
these men except John Marshall were members of the Federal
Convention.
It is interesting to note that Oliver Ellsworth, who strongly
favored judicial review, is credited with drafting the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789.80 This Act, setting up our federal courts,
was passed by the First Congress and approved by President
Washington on September 24, 1789. The Act provided for a Su.
preme Court, which was to consist of a chief justice and five
associate justices; and inferior courts, comprising circuit courts
and district courts for the separate states.8
Finally, in 1798 and 1799, when Virginia and Kentucky an-
nounced the doctrine of state nullification of acts of Congress, the
doctrine of judicial review was again brought to the forefront.
Several state legislatures called attention to the fact that the courts
alone had the power of judicial review."
28 3 ELLIOTT, op. cit., at 553.
29 4 ELLIOTT, at 160.
90 HAINES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 144.
$1 COxMA.ER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 153.
S2 It is interesting to note that the Legislature of New Hampshire resolved: "That
the state legislatures are not the proper tribunals to determine the constitutionality
of the laws of the general government; that the duty of such decision is properly and
exclusively confided to the judicial departments." 4 ELLIOTT, op. cit., at 539.
The Legislature of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations resolved: "That, in
the opinion of this legislature, the second section of the third article of the Constitu.
tion of the United States, in these words, to wit,-'The Judicial power shall extend to
all cases arising under the laws of the United States,'--vests in the Federal Courts,
exclusively, and in the Supreme Court of the United States, ultimately, the authority
of deciding on the constitutionality of any act or law of the Congress of the United
States." Id. at 533.
1953)
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Thus, in contrast to general belief, it is firmly proved from a
historical point of view that the doctrine of judicial review, as
propounded by the celebrated John Marshall in Marbury v. Madi-
son," was merely a reaffirmation of a judicial principle long since
established and practiced as a necessary corollary to the opera-
tion of the American system of jurisprudence.
1. R. Saylor.*
38 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
*B.A., M.A., Ph.D.; Professor of Government, East Texas State Teachers College.
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